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Abstract 
The 19th century whaling industry was dominated by the United States while the 20th century 
industry had its origins in Norway and was dominated for years by that nation. 
The focus of the paper, is to explore the relationship between the two so-called hegemonic 
whaling nations. Specifically, we are looking for encounters between the two industries that 
in one way or another may explain why the Norwegians did not enter into traditional pelagic 
whaling in the mid 19th century, and why the Americans did not enter “modern” whaling that 
emerged in the latter part of that century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Two Hegemonies – Two Technological Regimes:  
American and Norwegian Whaling in the 19th and 20th Century 
 
 
  “… no other nation in the world, can show any thing to compare with her 
  whale-catchers. Success attend them! In this business, which pre-eminently 
  requires all the great qualities requisite to make up a true man, she stands out 
  alone, far above all competition.” 
    The Boston Journal, according to The Scientific American, 
    Dec.3, 1859 (Vol. 1- No.23). 
 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
The 19th century was the American (U.S.) century of whaling. The 20th century was the 
Norwegian century – to put it simple at this point. Both nations dominated at different times 
world-wide industries in search of whale oil. Aside from that, there were few similarities 
between the two. While the American 19th century whaling was very much carried out the 
way whaling had been undertaken for centuries (a whaling vessel with tryworks, small 
chasing boats, hand held harpoons and lances...), the Norwegians modernized and 
industrialized whaling (powerful steam chaser boats, explosive grenade harpoon cannon, the 
floating factory...). The American whaling industry on a global scale, had its heydays in the 
early and mid 19th century, declined gradually in the 1860s, and was completely gone in the 
early 1920s. The Norwegian “modern” whaling started gradually in the 1860s (Svend Foyn’s 
first experiments in Finnmark), expanded in Norway and the Northern Hemisphere from the 
1880s, and became a world-wide industry – with the Antarctic and Southern Ocean as the 
main catching-grounds – from the first decade of the 20th century. 
 
The focus of the following analysis, is to try to explore more explicitly the relationship 
between the two so-called hegemonic whaling nations. The linkages may be analyzed in many 
ways. Specifically, we are looking for encounters between the two industries that in one way 
or another may explain (1) why the Norwegians did not enter into traditional pelagic whaling, 
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, August 2006 (Session 88: A 
Global Industry in Transition: Technological, Economic and Hegemonic Changes in 19th  Century Whaling). The 
initial research underlying this paper was done at the Kendall Institute, New Bedford Whaling Museum, and I 
am grateful for hospitality and assistance there. 
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and (2) why the Americans did not enter “modern” whaling. So, on the one hand we will look 
for Norwegian contact with the American industry in the 19th century. To what extent did the 
Norwegians take part in whaling in “the American century”, as crew-members or masters on 
board U.S. vessels, or with Norwegian vessels on the traditional whaling grounds in North 
and South Atlantic, the Pacific and Indian Ocean and Arctic waters? 
 
On the other hand, we will look for how the Americans faced the development of the 
emerging Norwegian industry in the latter part of the century. We will investigate the actual 
encounters between American “traditional” and Norwegian “modern” whalers later in the 19th 
century and the early 20th century. The two whaling “regimes” obviously co-existed for more 
than fifty years (from the 1860s and into the first two decades of the 20th century). They 
existed around the globe, to some extent on the same whaling grounds. 
 
Both issues relate to the question on how the transition from one hegemony to an other took 
place. How did they relate, and to what extent is it possible to see continuities and linkages 
between the two technological regimes? 
 
There is an extensive literature both on American and Norwegian whaling history. Some of 
this literature also explicitly deals with the decline of American 19th century whaling and the 
following transition period.2 We will discuss this literature, but also investigate contemporary 
sources (newspapers) and sources not utilized so far that shed light on Norwegian 
participation in 19th century pelagic whaling.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 The literature on American 19th century whaling spans from the contemporary classic accounts like A. 
Starbuck, History of the American Whale Fishery from its earliest Inception to the year 1876,  Waltham 1878, 
W.S. Tower, A History of the American Whale Fishery, Philadelphia (Publications of the University of 
Pennsylvania) 1907, E.P. Hohman, The American Whaleman. A Study of Life and Labor in the Whaling Industry, 
New York (Longmans, Green & Co) 1928 to the recent L.E. Davis, R.E. Gallman and K. Gleiter, In Pursuit of 
Leviathan. Productivity, Institutions, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816-1906, Chicago and London (The 
University of Chicago Press) 1997. The standard account of the history of modern whaling is A.O. Johnsen and 
J.N. Tønnessen, Den moderne hvalfangsts historie. Opprinnelse og utvikling, (I-IV), Oslo (Aschehoug) 1959 - 
1970. Especially, Johnsen’s introduction in vol. I (p. 45ff.) and Tønnessen in vol. II (p. 135ff) deal with  the 
relation between the Norwegian and the American industries.  
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Norwegian participation in 19th century pelagic whaling 
 
We will first turn to the question about Norwegian participation in the pelagic whaling in “the 
American Century”. From the literature on Norwegian whaling and maritime history we know 
that the Norwegian participation in the 19th century traditional whaling was almost non-
existent. It was, in the words of Risting, “helt ubetydelig” (quite in-significant).3 However, 
neither he nor any other historians have tried to find out how small the numbers really were. 
How insignificant was the Norwegian participation? How many men, masters and vessels 
were there? It may be impossible to find out, but some systematic research may reveal if the 
numbers were close to zero - or more. 
 
The literature on Norwegian maritime history mentions one vessel; the bark 17de Mai that 
sailed from Arendal in Southern Norway on December 21. 1843 on a whaling voyage into the 
Pacific Ocean, as far as to the whaling grounds off Kamchatka. The voyage was going to last 
for two years and seven months.4 The principal owner of the vessel was Christian Stephansen 
from Arendal. So, why did he and his fellow shareholders risk their capital in such an 
adventure? There was at the time a general knowledge, especially within the Norwegian 
maritime community, about the profitable whaling business that went on in the Pacific. A 
more specific reason for Mr. Stephansen to consider entering the business, was the knowledge 
of two successful Danish voyages of the bark Concordia (Captain T.J.  Sødring).5  Leaving 
for the second voyage in 1841, they called on Arendal for repairs, and Stephansen met with 
Captain Sødring. After the return to Copenhagen in 1843, they corresponded, and Mr. 
Stephansen received valuable advice. At about the same time, the announcement was 
published to buy shares in Stephansen’s enterprise. A vessel was bought.  A captain was 
hired, the 28 year old Frederik Crawfurd, son of a Scottish immigrant. The whaling expertice 
was in the hands of a French expedition leader (fangstleder), who had worked with Sødring 
on the two Danish voyages. Six mates and harpooners with former experience in the trade 
                                                 
3 S. Risting, Den norske Sjøfarts historie (ed. by J. Worm-Müller), vol. 3.2., p. 332, and Av Hvalfangstens 
Historie, Kristiania 1922, p. 95. 
4 The voyage of 17de Mai  is mentioned in several accounts of Norwegian maritime and whaling history, see f.ex. 
Risting, op.cit., p. 333, and B. Dannevig, Grimstads Sjøfarts historie, Grimstad 1971, p. 97 ff. The logbook has 
been edited and published; T. Hauge, Captain Crawfurds dagbog. En norsk hvalfangerferd 1843-1846 og andre 
europeiske lands deltagelse i Stillehavsfangsten 1800 - 1860, Oslo (Cappelen) 1953. 
5 Hauge, op.cit., p. 205.  Concordia also had a Norwegian crew member on board during her first voyage (a Mr. 
Martens from Bergen).  Accounts of her voyage were published as early as in 1841; see K. M. Rio, Oceania 
gjenoppdaget i Bergen. Reiser i Bergen Museums samlinger fra Stillehavet, (Bergen Museums skrifter , Kultur 
3), Universitetet i Bergen 1999, s. 19. 
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were recruited in Le Havre (a French whaling center), indicating that the Norwegians at the 
time were not trained in the trade. 
 
The whaling voyage of 17de Mai did not turn out to be a success. It visited several of the well 
known Pacific whaling grounds, and encountered plenty of whales, but their actual catching 
was by-and- large very disappointing. One reason could be the inexperience of the expedition 
as such. According to captain Crawfurd’s logbook, the main problem was the French 
expedition leader, who was drinking, behaved badly and did not pursue the whaling the way 
he ought to. 
 
Despite the meagre profit of the expedition, Mr. Stephansen and the shareholders decided to 
send 17de Mai on a second whaling voyage in 1847.  However, they wanted to make some 
improvements, probably according to advice from Captain Crawfurd who, during the first 
voyage entered in his logbook: 
“If this expedition succeeds, so that more people in Norway would be interested in similar 
expeditions, the cheapest way would be to engage a trustworthy man to travel over to New 
Bedford or a place close by, and buy a vessel and equip the vessel from there and hire 
American officers”. 6 
With the former First Mate as her new captain, 17de Mai sailed  for New York late May 1848 
with  20 Nowegian emigrants as passengers. The plan was then to buy whaling gear and hire 
officers and whalers on the U.S. east coast. However, arriving in New York, several sailors 
left the ship and equipment and hires turned out to be much more expensive than expected. 
When the captain was offered a wheat freight to Europe at favourable rates, he accepted.  
 
17de Mai never again went whaling.  She  may have been the first of its kind leaving a 
Norwegian port for a whaling voyage into the Pacific. The question is then, was she the only 
one? Was she both the beginning and the end of the 19th  century Norwegian pelagic whaling 
adventure? It is difficult to find out. As we have seen, the general literature does not mention 
other vessels.7 
 
                                                 
6 Logbook entry, August 9. 1844 (author’s translation), Hauge, op.cit., p. 86. 
7 Dannevig, op.cit., Risting, op.cit. 
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The fate of the 17de Mai obviously became known in the Norwegian maritime community, 
and did probably not encourage further initiatives. Captain Crawfurd himself, was most likely 
not an advocate among his colleagues. During the voyage, he also entered in his logbook: 
“As several captains have said to me, whaling is a trade (levebrød) no one should choose 
unless they are forced to”.8 He never went whaling again. He was not “forced to”, and the 
same was the case for other Norwegian captains and sailors that from the 1840s were in high 
demand due to very favourable business conditions in merchant shipping – conditions that 
were to last into the 1880s. This also involved the Pacific Ocean trade, that in many ways 
became a Norwegian specialty. Vessels were away for years sailing between Australia, the 
Pacific islands, North and South America.  
 
Norwegian sources have so far not revealed other examples of 19th century pelagic whaling 
than the one expedition that we have described.9   Another way to get a grip on the possible 
Norwegian involvement, is to look into American sources. Since this was very much an 
American dominated industry, it is very likely that there were encounters of several kinds 
between the Americans and the foreign whalers. Norwegian vessels might call at North 
American whaling ports, especially New Bedford to hire crew or supply whaling equipment 
(as we have seen, this is what 17de Mai planned for on her second voyage). They might even 
have gone there to sell their products, the oil and whale-bone – although this is not very 
likely. 
 
A more likely encounter would have been on the whaling grounds, or on the way to and from 
the whaling grounds. A useful source of information  (and probably the only one) is the 
vessels’ logbooks that normally would contain information about vessels that were seen; what 
was termed ships spoken. An index of ships spoken is available at the Kendall Institute (New 
Bedford Whaling Museum), based on reviews of their collection of around 450 logbooks, 
covering the most important era of American whaling (1804-1880).10 This, of course, does not 
cover all voyages, and obviously not all encounters that took place. However, the logbooks 
cover many seasons, and it is quite likely that if there were Norwegian vessels on the grounds, 
they were there for some time and would probably operate in areas where there were other 
                                                 
8 Logbook entry, August 8. 1844 (author’s translation), Hauge, op.cit., p. 85. 
9 Histories of the major local maritime communities in the 19th century (Kristiansand, Lillesand, Risør, Tønsberg, 
Larvik, Bergen) may reveal more examples. Other Norwegian sources would of course be sailing lists from the 
various ports, but to go through an entire century for dozens of ports would be an almost impossible task. 
10 The combined Kendall and New Bedford Whaling Museum collections amount to about 2200 logbooks and 
journals. 
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whalers. Consequently, they might turn up in the index of ships spoken, although it is in-
complete in coverage.  
 
So, what does the index reveal? The result of the search is listed in the Appendix I. Not one 
single whaling vessel of Norwegian origin was spoken. As we have emphasized, this does not 
prove that there were none. The logs were incomplete, so is probably also the indexing. The 
fact that the 17de Mai is not in the index, is a clear indication of the flaws connected to it. 
However, the index contains approximately 10.000 encounters, and the lack of Norwegian 
vessels should be a clear indication of the insignificance.  
 
We have also traced vessels spoken from the other Scandinavian countries, Denmark and 
Sweden. We have done this because the countries of origin may have been mixed up, in fact, 
one such vessel was located in the index. 11 It would also be of some interest to map the entire 
Scandinavian activities in terms of shipping and whaling encounters. Altogether 22 vessels of 
Scandinavian origin have been identified; 6 Norwegian vessels, 7 Swedish vessels and 9 
Danish vessels (Appendix I). Only one whaling vessel is among them; the Danish ship (or 
bark) Neptune was spoken by two different American whalers in 1844 and 1845. The 18th of 
June 1845 she was seen on the whaling grounds off Kamchatka searching for right whales.  
This whaling ship was, as a matter of fact, captained by the previous mentioned Sødring who 
had replaced Concordia with a newer vessel. Neptune also met with 17de Mai twice on her 
journey. 12  
 
One other vessel had a connection to the whaling trade; the Swedish brig Bull loaded 
whalebones from a New Bedford whaler in Maui in the Pacific on November 1. 1845 to bring 
it back to New Bedford. Other than that,  the Scandinavian vessels spoken were employed in 
general trade and mostly encountered the American whalers on their way along their sailing 
routes across or up and down the Atlantic, or along the Pacific South American coast. 
Typically, they were just passing. If they had a closer encounter, the whalers might buy food, 
send mail, or they exchanged longitude positions.   
 
                                                 
11 The famous New Bedford bark Charles W. Morgan entered in her logbook on 27th October 1911 that she  
spoke “the Norwegian bark Skien – from Stockholm”. The index listed Skien as a Swedish ship. 
12 Hauge, op.cit., p. 246. 
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What about Norwegian participation on American whaling voyages? Was that one type of 
encounter between the two nations that in one way or another made information about the 
development of the industry flowing between the two countries? The sources investigated 
reveal that such employment must have been very limited. A database on New Bedford 
whalers covering approximately 60.000 names, revealed two that had a certain Norwegian 
connection:13 
Crewman: John Andrew 
Residence: Fairhaven 
Vessel: Ship Hercules of New Bedford 
Departure Date: 8/10/1827 
Return Data: 7/15/1828 
Whaling Ground: S. Atlantic 
Remarks: Foreigner, born Norway 
 
Crewman: Frederick Hudermark 
Residence: Norway 
Vessel: Ship Balaena of New Bedford 
Departure Date: 10/29/1825 
Return Data: 12/3/1827 
Whaling Ground: Pacific 
Remarks: Discharged at Payta 04/1826 
 
There may, of course, have been more. John Andrew (who obviously had changed his name) 
was resident of Fairhaven, and for some reason stated his place of birth. Such information was 
once in a while included, but probably not always.  
 
A comprehensive source of information about late 18th and early / mid 19th century whaling in 
the Southern Hemisphere and the Pacific, is A.G.E. Jones, based on Lloyd’s Register, the 
Register of Shipping of the Society of Merchants and other sources.14 A list of more than 
3000 names of “harpooners, boat steerers, line coilers and others” employed in South Sea 
whaling between 1775 and 1859 reveals a few names with a Norwegian / Scandinavian origin 
or “flavour”, like Henry Hagen, Hans Petter Hansen and Carl E. Nordgren. However, their 
nationality is not stated. 
 
                                                 
13 New Bedford Free Public Library. 
14 A.G.E. Jones, Ships Employed in the South Seas Trade 1775-1859 , Vol. 2, (Roebuck Society Publication No. 
46), Burwood, Victoria 1991 (Brown Prior Anderson Pty Ltd). 
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Jones also compiled lists of vessels, merchants (owners) and masters employed in the trade – 
but no traces are found of Norwegian participation. 15  This is also the result after searching 
various compilations on American whaling vessels and their masters, from Starbuck, revisions 
to his list, to J.N. Lund’s recent work.16  Occasionally, names that may have a Scandinavian 
origin turn up (Carl Hansen and C.T. Pedersen are obvious candidates), but again the 
nationality are not stated. 
 
A fair conclusion at this point is that the Norwegian participation in 19th century pelagic 
whaling (vessels, crew, masters) indeed must have been in-significant. There may be several 
reasons for such limited involvement. We have already mentioned the favourable business 
conditions for Norwegian merchant shipping from the 1840s. A look at the general 
Norwegian emigration  pattern from Norway to the U.S. may also explain why so few ended 
up in whaling. The Norwegian immigration to the U.S. before the Civil War was limited. The 
first wave of mass-migration did occur in the la te 1860s and early 1870s, when the American 
whaling industry had already reached its peak. These immigrants obviously sought other 
opportunities. Most of them were farmers and ended up within this sector or in other land 
based trades. Immigrants with a maritime background were fishermen and sailors, and could 
find employment there if they wanted.  
 
Gjerset, in his history of Norwegian sailors employed in the U.S., wrote about whaling: 
“Some were employed in the whale fisheries, though their number was never great, since the 
immigrants had had little experience in whale fishing in their own country and the fisheries 
with which they were familiar were more attractive to them”.17 In the latter part of the 19th 
century, American whaling was not an attractive place to seek employment. The pay and 
working conditions were bad, the voyages were extremely long. The industry found it 
increasingly difficult to hire Americans and relied increasingly on crew from Cape Verde and 
the Azores.   Norwegian sailors from the mid 19th century had better alternatives. As we have 
seen, Norwegian shipping as such was growing in these years of  increased international trade 
                                                 
15 Five vessels are listed as Danish in the indexes; Ann, Flying Fish, Hannah, Lady Hamilton and Susanna. 
16  A. Starbuck, op.cit. (1878), Returns of Whaling Vessels sailing from American Ports. A Continuation of 
Alexander Starbuck’s “History of the American Whale Fishery” 1876-1928 (compiled by R. B. Hegarty), New 
Bedford (The Old Dartmouth Historical Society) 1959,  Addendum to “Starbuck” and “Whaling Masters” 
(compiled by R. B. Hegarty), New Bedford (New Bedford Free Public Library) 1964,  J. N. Lund, Whaling 
Masters and Whaling Voyages Sailing from American Ports, Sharon / New Bedford (New Bedford Whaling 
Museum / The Kendall Whaling Museum) 2001. 
17 K. Gjerset, Norwegian Sailors in American Waters. A Study in History of Maritime Activities on the Eastern 
Seaboard , Northfield, Min., (Norwegian-American Historical Association) 1933, p. 120. 
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and liberalization, so employment could be found on Norwegian ships. Payment was bad 
there, too. But if Norwegian sailors wanted to jump ship, whaling was not the option. This 
seems to have been the case also from the 1880s, when Norwegian shipping faced a severe 
crises and mass migration from Norway reached a second peak.  
 
A distinction should, of course, be made between crew and masters. The great majority of the 
American whaling masters had climbed the ranks within the New England whaling 
community. The barriers of entry for foreigners were high – in many ways similar to the later 
Norwegian domination of the gunner profession of the modern whaling industry. 
 
 
American decline – Norwegian expansion 
 
In the second half of the 19th century, the United States went through a significant process of 
industrialization that implied growth in new industries and major technological changes 
relating both products and processes. Well known terms like The Second Industrial 
Revolution and The American System of Manufactures both encompass this period. Industries 
were transformed, mechanized and rationalized.18  American whaling had been undertaken 
very much the same way for a long time. It was labour intensive, not very mechanized, little 
machinery was employed. The expansion throughout the 19th  century had very much been by 
way of capital widening rather than capital deepening. The productivity growth had been 
moderate.19 So, one would assume that the whaling industry was a very likely candidate to 
become transformed from a rather primitive “pre- industrial” industry, into a more modern, 
mechanized industry of the Second Industrial Revolution era. As A.O. Johnsen put it in the 
introduction to his volume on the history of modern whaling; one could assume that this stage 
of the development of the whaling industry would be initiated by the Americans almost with 
“the necessity of the order of nature”. 20 That did not happen – in the United States. Instead it 
was left to a small nation in the European periphery that at the time hardly had experienced an 
industrial breakthrough, and hardly had any whaling operations at all, to bring this industry 
forward into the “modern” industrialized world of the late 19th century. Why did it happen this 
                                                 
18 A recent review of this extensive topic; S. L. Engerman and K. L. Sokoloff, “Technology and 
Industrialization, 1790-1914”, in S. L. Engerman and R. E. Gallman, The Cambridge Economic History of the 
United States, Volume II, Cambridge (Cambridge University Press) 2000p. 367 ff. 
19 L.E. Davis, R.E. Gallman and K. Gleiter, op.cit., p. 297ff. 
20 A.O. Johnsen, op.cit., p. 45 (Author’s translation).  
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way? Why did not the Americans themselves lead the way into the next phase of development 
of this industry? Finally, how was it possible for small and peripheral Norway to mobilize the 
initiative, resources and entrepreneurial vitality that were needed to create a new industry and 
develop it into a global enterprise? 
 
A clear indication of the transition from one regime to another is the development in output in 
the two industries; the U.S. pelagic whaling and “modern” whaling (Figure 1). The U.S. 
whaling industry displayed a clear lifecycle over a century, with a peak in output, measured as 
the number of barrels of oil, in the 1840s and -50s.21 When the Norwegians started whaling in 
Northern Norway in the late 1860s, the American industry had already been decimated.  In the 
following years, the output of the two industries converged, and the Norwegian whaling 
surpassed the American in the early 1890s. At this time, the Norwegian industry had started 
its regional expansion to Iceland and other North Atlantic grounds (from the turn of the 
century). A dramatic change then occurred between 1905 and 1910 when the real world wide 
expansion started (Canada, Africa, Australia, Antarctica).   
 
In 1911 “modern” whaling for the first time surpassed the annual record output of  the 
American  industry from the 1840s and -50s.  “Modern” whaling at this point was very much 
a Norwegian led industrial expansion, although companies registered in other nations had 
entered the business.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The actual size and scale of the whaling trade may be measured in several ways; the number of whales killed, 
the number of vessels and manpower employed, the value of the output etc. The output also consisted of other 
products than oil. In U.S. 19th century pelagic whaling the whale bones (baleens) were the most important, while 
so called whale meal became important in “modern” 20th century whaling. The number of barrels is used here 
because it allows for easy comparison between the two periods. Other measures also display the same overall 
trends and show the same transition pattern. 
22 Focussing on the transition period, we have not extended the output series on “modern” whaling beyond 
World War I. From after the war the industry went into its all-time expansion on the Antarctic whaling grounds, 
culminating in the 1930/31 season with a world output of more than 3.6 million barrels. See International 
Whaling Statistics, 1933 (IV), Table i. 
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Figure 1: 
Estimated whaling outputs, 1816-1914
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Sources:  U.S. pelagic whaling: L.E. Davis, R.E. Gallman and K. Gleiter, In the Pursuit of 
Leviathan. Productivity, Institutions, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816-1906, Chicago 
and London (The University of Chicago Press) 1997, Table 9B.1. “Modern” whaling: 
International Whaling Statistics, Oslo 1931 (II),  S. Risting, Av hvalfangstens historie, 
Kristiania (Cappelen) 1922, J.N. Tønnessen, Den moderne hvalfangsts historie, Vol. II, 
Sandefjord 1967, p. 549ff. 
Note:  The statistics on modern whaling include whaling on all grounds world wide. Some 
reports list the number of whales while other list number of barrels. A re-calculation was 
therefore necessary in some years, hence the figure is titled Estimated whaling outputs. See 
Appendix II for the full list of data, sources and calculation procedures.  
 
 
 
 
Explaining the American decline, the Norwegian expansion, and the relationship between the 
two phenomena, has been an issue in the historical writing on these industries for a long time. 
Both American and Norwegian historians of whaling have over the years been intrigued by 
the puzzle, and attempted to give answers. The decline of the American whaling industry was 
also addressed by contemporary scholars. Starbuck, in his influential study published in 1878, 
summarized his observations in the following way: 
 13 
“Whaling as a business has declined; 1st, from the scarcity and shyness of whales, requiring 
longer and more expensive voyages; 2nd, extravagances in fitting out and refitting; 3rd, the 
character of the men engaged; 4th, the introduction of coal-oils”.23 
 
The most systematic contemporary analysis of the decline of the industry is perhaps that 
written by W.S. Tower  in 1907. He puts forward seven factors – some of them identical to 
Starbuck’s – that more or less have been reflected by later writers: 24 
 The nature of the business (high uncertainty) 
 Increasing risks of losses (longer voyages, less whales) 
 The California gold rush (sailors and officers left the ships) 
 The rise of the cotton textile industry 
 The introduction of  mineral oil 
 The Civil War 
 The Arctic disaster of 1871  
 
His final remarks in the book was written about half a century after The Boston Globe’s 
optimistic outlook (see pre-script), and it had now turned into the gravest pessimism: 
“…the future seems to hold nothing. Whaling no longer ranks as an important commercial 
interest even in the localities from which it is carried on. The most optimistic view of the 
future reveals no prospect of any chance for permanent growth or development. The 
economic conditions under which whaling prospered have ceased to exist, never to be 
revived. The chief influences which induced the decline of whaling have not been abated in 
the slightest degree. The death knell of whaling was sounded fifty years ago. It may almost be 
said that whaling is already dead.”25 
 
It is interesting to note that Tower made no reference to the emerging Norwegian industry. 
His pessimistic remarks were written just when the Norwegians transferred the industry to 
Antarctic waters, and brought it into a new phase. 
 
E.P. Hohman wrote a history of the American whaling industry published in 1928, thus 
enabling him to follow the industry into its “Derelict”, “Disintegration” and “Decay”.26  Not 
even Hohman  mentioned the Antarctic whaling industry, that at his point  was in the  midst of 
an immense expansion. However, in 1935 he published  a paper where he explicitly compared 
the two whaling nations, the United States and Norway.27 He started out by observing the fact 
that while Svend Foyn initiated a new industry in the 1860s, the American whaling declined 
from the same time. He then asked; Why did it happen: “What were the forces which thus 
                                                 
23 A. Starbuck, op.cit., p. 113. 
24 W.S. Tower, op.cit., p. 72ff.. 
25 Ibid., p. 115. 
26 E.P. Hohman, op.cit.,  Part III and chapter XIV. 
27 E.P. Hohman, ”American and Norwegian Whaling: A Comparative Study of Labour and Industrial 
Organization”, The Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 43, No. 5 (October) 1935, pp. 628-652. 
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enabled Old World whaling to rise phoenix- like out of the ashes of the New World industry? 
Why did New England surrender so casually to Norway her position of supremacy among the 
world’s blubber hunters?”28  Hohman’s paper deals mainly with a comparison of labour 
conditions and organization of the two industries, but in his introduction he suggests an 
answer to why the Americans surrendered: “Chiefly, it must be said, because she did not 
choose to fight, because her economic interests and activities were shifting into other and 
more profitable channels.” He mentioned the petroleum as the main challenge that reduced 
the demand for whale oil for traditional uses (illuminants and lubricants). At the same time, 
the old whaling grounds were exhausted. A response could be 
 
 “a thorough  technological reorganisation of the industry. New England, however, was not 
disposed to provide the necessary capital for such a reorganization , because the prospects for 
profit were far greater in textiles, shoes, and other industries at home and in the magnificent 
natural resources of the West. New England man-power, too, was being weaned away from 
the sea by the siren call of the prairie”.29    
 
So, instead it was left to the Norwegians to undertake the technological reorganization. They 
had, according to Hohman, “a less promising hinterland and a stronger economic pull toward 
the sea...”. 30 
 
Hohman’s main explanation of the decline and raise of the two whaling hegemonies has never 
really been challenged.  Davis and Gallman, who analyzed the development of the American 
industry by rigorous statistical and econometric methods, focusing on general economic 
factors like demand, supply, technology, labour and capital, also offer a multi- faceted picture 
of explanations.31 They emphasise changes in demand (the development of new lubricants and 
illuminants) as well as changes in supply (competition for labour and capital ashore). They 
explicitly reject, however, the common notion that the decline in part was caused by the 
depletion of the whale-stocks. When it comes to the question of why the Americans left to the 
Norwegians to bring the industry into its new stage, Davis and Gallman writes in the last 
sentences of their book: 
 
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p. 628. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 629. 
31 Davis et.al., op.cit.,p. 513ff. 
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“Thus, while the free availability of the ocean’s whales made it possible for the United States 
to achieve its midcentury leadership in whaling, in the long run that availability made it 
possible for the Norwegians to dislodge the Americans from that position. Lower wages, 
lower opportunity costs of capital, and a lack of entrepreneurial alternatives pushed the 
Norwegians into exploiting the whale stocks. Higher wages, higher opportunity costs of 
capital, and a plethoria of entrepreneurial alternatives turned Americans – even those from 
New Bedford – towards the domestic economy”.32 
 
 
Labour cost differences were evident. In New England, whalers were paid less than most 
comparable alternatives ashore. In Norway, the opposite was the case. Even the lower rank 
sailors aboard the new whaling vessels were better paid than average salaries ashore. More 
important; their wages were higher than the sailors’ wages aboard merchant ships – a very 
likely alternative employment in the costal Vestfold communities of the late nineteenth 
century. 33  
 
The high opportunity cost of capital also seems to be quite evident in the American case, and 
has been emphasized (although in less academic terms) by most historians. The assumed 
comparably lower opportunity cost of capital and lack of entrepreneurial alternatives in 
Norway seem evident, too, but the assumption has to be modified. Norway was obviously late 
in industrialization, and what took place in the latter part of the 19th century, was not really 
concentrated in the Vestfold region. So, at least compared to the economic atmosphere of the 
New England area, there was a less visible inward “surge” that competed with whaling. The 
alternative business opportunities were mostly to be found in the maritime industries. In 
Vestfold in the mid 19th  century, this meant Arctic sealing and merchant shipping world 
wide. Both were attractive commercial activities in the 1840s, -50s and -60s, and may, as we 
have seen, be one explanation why the Norwegians in this business environment did not 
consider pelagic traditional American style whaling at the time. Svend Foyn himself had 
made a fortune in sealing when he started his experiments that led to the breakthrough of 
modern whaling. At that time (1860s) sealskin prices were decreasing due to a large 
expansion of the industry. That worried Foyn, and was one of the reasons that he sold out.34 In 
his fifties (he was born in 1809) he could have retired as a wealthy man, so the explanation of 
his further work must be sought in his extraordinary entrepreneurial drive. 
 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 521. 
33 Johnsen, op.cit., p. 48ff. 
34 A.O. Johnsen, Svend Foyn og hans dagbok , Oslo (Fabritius) 1943. 
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Svend Foyn operated alone in the industry he was about to create until the 1880s due to his 
patents that created an effective barrier of entry. When expansion became possible in the 
1880s and -90s, the local interest in Sandefjord and Tønsberg was strong. At the time the 
merchant shipping  had begun to face hard times in this era of the Long Depression. Also 
Arctic sealing was definitely in decline. So, the opportunity cost of capital as well as “lack of 
entrepreneurial alternatives” pointed in the direction of the new Finnmark whaling grounds.35  
 
Davis and Gallman, in discussing the American decline, ask the question “Is whaling an 
example of American entrepreneurial failure?”36 Their answer is no. In addition to the issues 
we have just mentioned, they also discuss one specific challenge the American whaling 
entrepreneurs had to face: The “new system of whaling made the entire American capital 
stock – both physical and human – completely obsolete.”37 That is obviously a correct 
observation. Foyn’s concept was by all means technologically something different that 
required a complete replacement. In a comparative perspective, however, it should be noted 
that the same applied to the Norwegian entrepreneurs. Foyn and many entrepreneurs 
following him, had been engaged in sealing or bottlenose whaling with sailing vessels or 
steam-sailing vessels. They had no use for their old equipment in the new business. Davis and 
Gallman also mention the Americans ’ comparative advantage in the design and manufacture 
of wooden sailing vessels compared to iron-hulled steamships. The same definitely applied to 
Norway of the late 19th century – a well known example of late transition from sail to steam. 38 
 
Davis and Gallman are probably correct in rejecting the entrepreneurial failure hypothesis. 
The New England businessmen failed in keeping up with the development of the whaling 
industry, but that should not be the sole criterion of success or failure in business. They 
sought other arenas. When it comes to the Norwegian entrance into the business, the 
entrepreneurial factor seems obvious. Svend Foyn was, as we have pointed out, in most 
respects a typical entrepreneur who could have retired wealthy when he instead ventured into 
years of uncertainty that finally became the basis of a new industry. 39 
                                                 
35 For some local businessmen it also led into the bottlenose whaling in the North Sea. This became a transition 
period between sealing and modern whaling during the last two decades of the 19th century. 
36 Davis et.al., op.cit., p. 520. 
37 Ibid. 
38 L.R. Fischer and H.W. Nordvik, “Maritime Transport and the Integration of the North Atlantic Economy, 
1850-1914”, in W. Fischer et.al. (eds.), The Emergence of a World Economy, 1500-1914, Wiesbaden (Klett-
Cotta Verlag) 1986. 
39 Britain’s reluctant transition from traditional to modern whaling  will not be discussed here, but offers a 
parallel example when it comes to entrepreneurial response. G. Jackson initially emphasized the supply side 
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We will leave the discussion for now on the reasons for the American decline and the 
Norwegian growth. Instead we will focus on the related question of how the Americans 
viewed and experienced the new development when Norwegians entered the stage from the 
1860s. This may also shed light on how the transition period should be understood. 
 
 
The Americans and the emerging modern Norwegian whaling 
 
Sven Foyn’s  operations from the 1860s onwards did not go on un-noticed to the outside 
world. News at the time went fast across the Atlantic, not least within the maritime 
communities. We may assume that rumours developed very soon in the New England whaling 
communities after Foyn had shot his first whales in Finnmark.  
 
Probably the first American whaler to see Foyn and his new vessel Spes & Fides, was Thomas 
W. Roys. Their encounter in Iceland in the summer of 1866 is an interesting incident that 
illustrates the transition period of the industry. Both Foyn and Roys were experimenting with 
new methods and technology. Roys had a career in the American whaling trade when he 
started his experiments with the rocket harpoon at Iceland in 1859, employing steam vessels 
and a rudimentary shore station. He was “the first to apply methods of the machine age to the 
whaling trade”. 40  So, at this point in time, it was Foyn who came to learn, taking a detour on 
his way from Tønsberg to Finnmark. He did indeed pick up ideas from Roys (most well 
known is the so-called accumulator), but time would soon show that while Foyn’s concept 
proved successful, Roys never got beyond experimentation. 41 He went back to New York in 
1867, and continued his work, unsuccessfully, in California and British Columbia until 1871.  
To which extent he conveyed to the American whaling community what he had experienced 
during his encounter with Foyn in 1866,  is not known. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
failures, but has later modified his view; see his re-published The British Whaling Trade, Research in Maritime 
History No. 29, St. John’s 2005, pp. ix and 137. See also a recent discussion in N. Watson, The Dundee Whalers 
1750-1914,  East Linton (Tuckwell Press) 2003, p. 145. 
40 F.P. Schmitt, C. de Jong and F. H. Winter, Thomas Welcome Roys. America’s Pioneer of Modern Whaling, 
Charlottesville (The University Press of Virginia) 1980, p. ix. 
41 Ibid., p. 140ff. See also A.O. Johnsen, Svend Foyn og hans dagbok , Oslo (Fabrit ius) 1943, p. 60 and 113ff, and  
J.N. Tønnessen and A.O. Johnsen, The History of Modern Whaling, London (C. Hurst & Co) p. 16ff. 
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A look at contemporary sources in the U.S. on the Norwegian emerging industry reveals, 
however, that it took some time before it appeared in writing. Starbuck (1878) – the classic 
starting point – had no mentioning of the Norwegian industry. A major newspaper in the 
American whaling community was the Whalemen’s Shipping List and Merchants Transcript 
published in New Bedford. As far as we know, news about the emerging whaling industry in 
Norway was not printed before in 1882.42 A small article titled “The Norway Whale-fishery”, 
was based on a report from the U.S. consul in Christiania, Norway, and begun as follows: 
“The whaling business in Norway increases and engages larger capital every year”. It also 
contained information that should be of interest to the American whaling community. 
Abundance of whales were reported, and a comparison of the Norwegian and the Scottish 
Dundee fleet, that was still operating in traditional style at the Greenland Coast, left no doubts 
about where the largest catches and profits were to be found. However, the paper made no 
reference to the American industry – then in decline – or anticipated a prosperous future for 
the Norwegian industry. To the contrary, it referred to the consul’s worries about the 
limitations of the Finnmark grounds where the whales soon might disappear, protests from the 
fishermen in the north, and a general “prejudice” among the Swedes (sic.) in the south.  
 
In G. Brown Good’s book on the U.S. fishery industries  published in the mid 1880s, one 
section, written by J.T. Brown and A.H. Clark, is devoted to the “Whale-Fishery”. 43 Brown, 
in his review of whaling methods as of the 1880s, limits himself to deal with “orthodox and 
customary methods” in the American industry, and there is no mentioning what-so-ever of the 
development in Norway. Clark, on the other hand, reviews the industry in other countries, 
among others the Norwegian development beginning with Foyn. 44  However, his account is 
little more than quotes from the consular report  published in the 1882 Whalemen’s Shipping 
List, which indicates that the focus was more on problems than on opportunities. 
 
A third example of information about the Norwegian industry that was conveyed to the 
American public about the same time (1885), was a full page article (with two illustrations) in 
Scientific American.45 The article was written by a Frenchman after a visit at Foyn’s plant in 
                                                 
42 Whalemen’s Shipping List and Merchants Transcript, March 21. 1882, p. 2, c. 5. (Microfilm, Kendall Institute, 
New Bedford Whaling Museum). 
43 G. Brown Good (ed.), The Fisheries and Fishery Industries of the United States, Washington 1884-87, Part 
XV, The Whale-Fishery; (1) “History and Present Conditions of the Fishery”, by A. Howard Clark, (2) “The 
Whalemen, Vessels, Apparatus and Methods of the Fishery”, by J.T. Brown. 
44 Ibid. p. 195 ff. 
45 Scientific American, Vol. LII, No. 20, May 16. 1885. 
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Vadsø (Finnmark). It first appeared in La Natura, and was then translated. So, it was not 
directed specifically towards the American whaling community, and did not have any 
references to it. It was obviously written by a person with no relationship to the industry, and 
focused on the negative aspects of his experience. He concluded; “We had never seen 
anything so repulsive”. On the other hand, he described equipment, methods and techniques 
that clearly show how this was a different industry from the one the Americans were familiar 
with. 
 
In 1898 the Cabot  Steam Whaling Company (founded in 1896 as a joint Norwegian / 
Newfoundland venture) started whaling at the Newfoundland coast. In the years to follow, 
this industry expanded and in 1905 a similar development occurred in British Columbia.46  
Modern whaling had reached the North American shores, and the American attention to the 
new industry obviously increased. Even the general reader was now kept informed  and 
reminded of the connection to the once so proud American industry. An extensive article in 
the New York Times in March 1900 titled “Whale Hunting of To-Day”, reported on a visit to 
the Cabot station:  
 
“Most persons think of whaling as an industry pursued with a buff-bowed old vessel beating 
her way round the world, manned by New England farmers and the refuse of crimps’ lodging 
houses, and attacking the leviathans of the deep in frail boats with harpoons and lances. 
Nothing could be more at variance with the modern method of whale hunting, for science has 
enlisted in the pursuit the most efficient as well as most destructive of accessories, and the 
killing of the cetacea has been transformed from an adventurous pursuit, abounding in 
excitement and hairbreadth escapes, into a matter-of-fact, every-day business undertaken”. 47 
 
We are not aware of encounters between American whalers and the whalers of the new 
industry at Newfoundland, although Newfoundland belonged to the traditional whaling 
grounds.48  Such encounters may have taken place at various grounds after the turn of the 
century when modern whaling expanded worldwide, and American whalers, although in 
declining numbers, still ploughed the world oceans. One such encounter, often quoted, 
occurred in South Georgia in 1912/13 when the New Bedford whaling and sealing brig Daisy   
entered the domain of the Grytviken whaling station, that at the time had operated for some 
nine seasons. The American whalers obviously felt that they had been caught up by a new era. 
                                                 
46 A.B. Dickinson and C. W. Sanger, Twentieth-Century Shore Station Whaling in Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Montreal (McGill-Queen’s University Press), p. 22ff., R. Lloyd Webb, On the Northwest. Commercial Whaling 
in the Pacific Northwest 1790-1967 , Vancouver (British Colombia University Press) 1988, p. 142ff. 
47 New York Times, March 4.,1900, p. 6. 
48 Dickinson and Sanger, op.cit. p. 10. 
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In scientist Robert Murphy’s words: “...our old Yankee whaling has long since passed its day 
of glory, and the few present participants represent anachronisms of the old calling”.49 Indeed, 
only a few New England whalers were still active. 
 
The definite end of American old style pelagic whaling in the early / mid 1920s coincided 
with the dramatic expansion of modern pelagic whaling in Antarctica. The symbolic meaning 
of this was noted by several observers. American newspapers featured articles about the 
expanding, mostly Norwegian, industry or whaling factory ships that called on U.S. ports to 
deliver oil. For example, the New York Times wrote in 1928; “Today it is no longer  New 
Bedford  that is the centre of the world’s whaling interests. The scene has shifted to Southern 
Norway”. 50  Two years later, the same newspaper ran an article focussing on the big profits of  
Antarctic whaling. It also, in the headline, gave a hint to the former U.S. industry: “While 
Once Active Cape Cod Lives on Memories – An Incentive to Exploration”. In a rather 
rhetorical statement, we can read that “Profits are so exceptional that Yankees, having 
dropped out of business, must doubt – if they ever believed – their own reputation for 
smartness”. 51  In this very year, 1930, the U.S. did enter into modern whaling when the 
floating factory ship Frango, owned by the new American Whaling Company, was sent to 
Antarctica. The company was a joint Norwegian / American enterprise, initiated by the 
Norwegian whaling company owner Lars Christensen (with 51 percent of the shares).52  
 
The only other direct U.S. involvement in modern pelagic whaling was Western Operation 
Company, registered in 1936 with an office in New York. It had a minority of American 
shareholders (about one-sixth of the shares), and the dominant owner was Anders Jahre, 
another of the most active Norwegian whaling entrepreneurs at the time.53 The floating 
factory Ulysses was manned with Norwegian whalers, and the catcher boats came from 
Norway. Both Frango and Ulysses were lost during World War II, and no whaling ships were 
registered in the  U.S. to participate in the following post-war Antarctic expansion.  
 
These two whaling companies of the 1930s were not American initiatives. They were 
established to provide market access, tax advantages and expansion in a period where 
                                                 
49 R.C. Murphy, Logbook for Grace. Whaling Brig Daisy, 1912-1913, New York (MacMillan) 1947, p. 233. 
50 New York Times, November 4., 1928, p. 145. 
51 New York Times, February 2., 1930, p. 128. 
52 Tønnessen and Johnsen, op.cit. p. 381. 
53 Ibid., p. 451.  
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Norwegian and British authorities tried to pose restrictions on the industry. New York 
provided a convenient office address. This strategy was also pursued by the enfant terrible of 
the whaling industry in the 1950s; Aristoteles Onassis. His Olympic Whaling Co. was 
registered in Montevideo (Uruguay), the fleet flew several different flags of convenience - but 
the head office was in New York.54 So, this company – and the two previously mentioned – 
had a rather weak linkage to the U.S. The linkage to the industry’s old centre in New England 
was non-existent.  Neither the whalers nor the capital originated there. New Bedford had been 
replaced by New York. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have explored into a transition period between two industries, the American 
whaling industry of the 19th century and the so called “modern” whaling of the 20th century 
that was initiated by the Norwegians. The main questions have related why Norway, a 
maritime nation throughout the 19th century, never took an active part in the American 
century of whaling, and why the Americans never  took an active part in the new emerging 
“modern” whaling when their own industry went into a decline. We have looked for 
encounters between the nations and the industries that might shed light on the transition. A 
special focus has been on Norwegian contact with the American industry throughout the 19th 
century, an issue that has so far been less explored.   
 
There were numerous encounters, and the maritime communities of the two countries were 
well aware of the development of the industries abroad. This applies to the Norwegians during 
the heydays of American whaling, as well as to the New England whalers during the period of 
the emerging Norwegian industry. Lack of information was not a reason that the Norwegians 
did not enter traditional whaling of the early and mid 19th century. Neither can it explain why 
the Americans did not enter “modern” whaling from the 1860s. Explanations must primarily 
be sought in internal economic and industrial transition patterns of the two countries. So, 
“modern” whaling did not develop from traditional whaling. To the extent that the U.S. 
became involved in “modern” whaling, it had no relation to the old whaling communities of 
New England. The emerging Norwegian whaling industry had no links to the American 
                                                 
54 Ibid., p. 534. 
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industry, that was still a global industry when Svend Foyn shot his first whale from Spes & 
Fides. There is a conspicuous lack of continuity between the two technological regimes. 
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APPENDIX I: 
Scandinavian vessels spoken by American whalers  
 
Source: Index of Ships Spoken, Kendall Institute, New Bedford Whaling Museum (Card 
catalogue). 
 
(a) Norwegian vessels spoken: 
 
Ship spoken Fix, schooner of Christiansand 
From logbook Log # 102: Hercules, bark of New Bedford 
Aug. 23, 1871 - Aug. 2, 1875 (Complete v., Indian O.) 
Oct. 19, 1875 - Aug. 26, 1879 (Partial v., Indian O.) 
Entry p. 261, Cruising in Atlantic, Thursday, July 24, 1879: 
“Boarded the schooner Fix of Christiansand waterlogged mainmast 
standing. Got 2 bbls Pork and 2/3 bbls Petroleum oil.” 
(lat. 34-40, long. 44-25) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Niagara, bark of Norway 
From logbook Log #  237: Platina, bark of Westport 
May 23, 1867 - June 13, 1871 (Complete v., N. and S. Pacific) 
Entry p. 4, Tuesday, June 4 (year ?): 
“...spoke the Bark Niagara of Norway 24 days from Stdeminga bound to 
Norway.” 
Comment  Stdeminga is St. Domingo in the Caribbean. 
 
 
Ship spoken John, brig of Christiania 
From logbook Log # 126: Lafayette, bark of New Bedford 
May 29, 1861 - Dec. 4, 1861 (Complete v., N. Atlantic) 
Entry p. 24: Monday, August 5, 1861: 
“Exchanged signals with the Brig John of Christiania. Bound East” 
(lat. 44-00 N, long. 37-00 W) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Peter Lund, bark of Norway 
From logbook Log # 167: Pedro Varela of New Bedford 
April 5, 1881 - Oct 14, 1883 (Complete v., N. and S. Atlantic) 
Entry p. 174: June 30, 1883: 
“Have also seen a Merchant Bark. Daniel sent a boat to her with letters 
and I was glad enough to get one started for home to mother. The bark 
was Norwegian from .... bound for Arendal ....her name was Peter Lund.” 
Comment   
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Ship spoken Skien, bark of Norway 
From logbook Log # 510-1: Charles W. Morgan, bark of New Bedford 
May 10, 1911 - Aug. 9, 1913 (Complete v., Indian O., S. Atlantic) 
Entry p. 80: Friday, Oct. 27, 1911: 
“Spoke the Norwegian Bark Skien - from Stockholm, bound to Sydney, 
Australia”. 
(lat. 23-06, long. 22-48, sailing south from Fayal (Azores) to Cape 
Verde) 
Comment  The entry is incorrect, Stockholm being the Swedish capital. The vessel’s 
name, however, indicates that it is Norwegian; Skien being a port town 
on the south-east coast of Norway. The vessel’s name is spelled “Skieir” 
on the index card, which also must be incorrect. 
 
 
Ship spoken Unidentified, brig of Norway 
From logbook Log # 407: Virginia, ship of New Bedford 
Nov. 7, 1843 - June 5, 1847 (Complete v., N.-S. Pacific) 
Entry p. 138: Saturday, April 3, 1847: 
“... saw and shared signals with a Norwegian Brig heading N East under 
short sail”. 
(lat. 49-55, off Cape Horn) 
Comment   
 
 
 
(b) Swedish vessels spoken: 
 
Ship spoken Aerial, bark of Gothenburg 
From logbook Log # 340: Robert Edwards, ship of New Bedford 
Sept. 6, 1853 - July 25, 1857 (Complete v., S. Pacific) 
Entry p. 9: Tuesday, September 27, 1853: 
“...spoke the Barque Aerial of Gothenburg”. 
(lat. 38-17 N, long. 38-40 W) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Andre, brig of Stockholm 
From logbook Log # 723: Gratitude, bark of New Bedford 
September 6, 1854 - June 3, 1858 (Complete v.) 
Entry p. 19: Saturday, November 11, 1854: 
“Spoke Brig Andre  (?) of Stockholm from Cadiz for Rio-Janeiro, and 
sent letters by her”. 
(lat. 12.55 S, long. 31-39 W, Southbound for Cape Horn) 
Comment   
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Ship spoken Anna, ship of Gluckstad, Sweden 
From logbook Log # 20: Ariel, ship of Hull 
March 14, 1827 - Sept. 14, 1827 (Complete v., Spitsbergen) 
Entry p, 10: Saturday, April 7, 1827: 
“Spoke the Anna of Gluckstad with three seals. Johan Mayan Bearing”. 
(lat. 70-45) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Aurora, brig of Stockholm 
From logbook Log # 325: Ontario, ship of Nantucket 
Nov. 27, 1832 - Aug. 13, 1836 (Complete v., S. Pacific) 
Entry p. 9: Sunday, December 16, 1832: 
“Spoke the brig Aurora from Stockholm bound to New York and sent 
letters at 8 PM”. 
(lat. 35-40, a few days out, on the way south) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Bull, brig of Sweden 
From logbook Log # 375: Fortune, bark of New Bedford 
Nov. 17, 1844 - March 17, 1847 (Part. of incomplete v., N. Pacific) 
Entry p. 89: Saturday, Nov. 1, 1845:  
“At Lahaina at ancor” 
“All hands employed in .... bones & conveying it on board the Swedish 
Brig Bull bound to New Bedford. 9.080 lbs”. 
Comment  Lahaina was a popular port for whaling vessels at Maui, Sandwich 
Islands. 
 
 
 
 
Ship spoken Unidentified, barkentine of Sweden 
From logbook Log # 620: Sunbeam, bark of New Bedford 
August 12, 1890 - June 19, 1893 (Complete v., N. and S. Atlantic) 
Entry p. 32: Wednesday, January 21, 1891: 
“Signalized a Swedish Barkentine and gave her our Long”. 
(lat. 34-14, long. 48-09 (Day before)) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Therapiss, bark of Gothenburg 
From logbook Log # 553: Barnstable, bark of New Bedford 
May 22, 1860 - April 26, 1864 (Complete v., India, N. and S. Pacific, W. 
Arctic) 
Entry p. 22: Thursday, October 4, 1860: 
“.... with a swedish barque Therapiss (?) from portsmouth bound to the 
cape of good hope. belong to gothenburg”. 
Comment   
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(c) Danish vessels spoken 
 
Ship spoken Anna, ship of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 177: Roscius, bark of New Bedford 
Oct. 8, 1861 - March 8, 1863 (Three voyages, N. Atlantic) 
Entry p. 32: Monday, Jan. 21, 1862: 
“....proved to be the brig Anna of Sainberg (?) Danish. We sent some 
letters on board her.” 
(lat. 24-33, long. 39-21) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Eric II, steamship of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 196: Valkyria, Schooner of New Bedford 
July 2, 1914 - Sept. 22, 1916 (Complete v., N. and S. Atlantic) 
Entry p. 105: May 8, 1916: 
“Saw a Danish steamer the Eric II bound S”. 
(lat. 23-02 N, long. 63-55 W) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Galathea, frigate of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 12 (pp. 104-105 and 154 (p. 125): 
Entry  
Comment  Not seen logbook 
 
 
Ship spoken Lydia, bark of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 92: Franklin, schooner of New Bedford 
Oct. 9, 1883 - Aug. 23. 1885 (Complete v., N. Atlantic) 
Entry p. 79: Wednesday, June 10, 1885: 
“...took the longitude from a Danish Barque Lydia”. 
(lat. 31-05, long. 77-20) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Neptune, bark of Copenhagen 
From logbook Log # 241: Vernon, ship of New Bedford 
Dec. 1, 1843 - May 21, 1846 (Complete v., S. and N. Pacific) 
Entry p. 134: Wednesday, June 18th, 1845  
“At 4 PM spoke the Neptune of Copenhagen 19 Months out 2800 bls.” 
(Cruising on the SE side of Kamtskatha for Right Whales) 
Comment  This whaler is probably the same vessel as the one spoken by Heroine.  
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Ship spoken Neptune, ship of Copenhagen 
From logbook Log # 726: Heroine, ship of Fairhaven 
June 15, 1843 - Sept. 14, 1847 (Two voyages, Pacific) 
Entry p. 75: Sunday, May 6, 1844: 
“Spoke ship Neptune of Copenhagen 150 days out clean”. 
(lat. 36-58, long. 176-00 E) 
Comment  This whaler is probably the same vessel as the one spoken by Vernon. 
 
 
Ship spoken Orscoe, bark of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 68: Desdemoda, bark of New Bedford 
Sept. 5, 1865 - June 1, 1869 (Complete v., Indian O.) 
Entry p. 240: Febr. 25, 1868: 
“...spoke Bark Orscoe of Denmark from China bound to New York...”. 
(lat. 30-50 S, long 40...) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Susana, bark of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 472: Sea Breeze, bark of New Bedford 
Sept. 1, 1853 - June 30, 1856 (Complete v., S. Pacific) 
Entry p. 320: Wednesday, June 5,1856: 
“...spoke the Brig Susana of Denmark steering WSW....exchanged 
longitudes...”. 
(lat. 06-15, long. 34-40, homeward bound) 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Unidentified,  bark of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 410: Ocean Rover, bark of Mattapoisett 
May 26, 1859 - Sept. 7, 1862 (Partial / incomplete v., N. and S. Atlantic, 
Indian O., sunk by C.S.S. Alabama) 
Entry p. 218: Tuesday, February 18, 1862: 
“Saw a Danish Bark Steering East”. 
(lat. 36-10 S, long. 46-41 W, Cruising on River Laplata). 
Comment   
 
 
Ship spoken Unidentified, ship of Denmark 
From logbook Log # 399: Poenix, ship of New Bedford 
August 3, 1847 - May 28, 1851 (Complete v., S. and N. Pacific) 
Entry p. 181: Friday, February 21, 1851: 
“...exchanged signals with a Danish ship”. 
(lat. 52-2, long. 83-30, homeward bound, S towards Cape Horn) 
Comment   
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APPENDIX II: 
Estimated whaling outputs, 1816-1914. Barrels of whale oil in American pelagic whaling 
(I) and “modern” whaling (II) 
 
         Year                          (I)               (II)                               
1816  16889 
1817  51121 
1818  37928 
1819  59555 
1820  79465 
1821  81623 
1822  94327 
1823  147168 
1824  156327 
1825  113991 
1826  64382 
1827  129445 
1828  129110 
1829  146243 
1830  200424 
1831  230048 
1832  254078 
1833  268029 
1834  255124 
1835  289899 
1836  269902 
1837  372036 
1838  358908 
1839  372119 
1840  365699 
1841  366652 
1842  326678 
1843  373712 
1844  401641 
1845  430647 
1846  302710 
1847  433903 
1848  388632 
1849  349436 
1850  293500 
1851  428074 
1852  163083 
1853  363191 
1854  396533 
1855  256664 
1856  278831 
1857  309381 
1858  264164 
1859  281819 
1860  213713 
1861  202649 
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1862  156128 
1863  128029 
1864  136235 
 
1865 
  
108480 
1866  110965 
1867  132722 
1868  112749 900 
 1869  132947 510 
1870  127874 1080 
1871  116691 600 
1872  76276 1200 
1873  82067 1080 
1874  69985 1530 
1875  77211 1170 
1876  72821 1350 
1877  68310 1080 
1878  77268 3480 
1879  64642 3900 
1880  72390 4890 
1881  62275 8490 
1882  53255 10530 
1883  48765 17070 
1884  46769 14550 
1885  65789 29880 
1886  50561 27420 
1887  53044 25196 
1888  33450 22065 
1889  32974 18372 
1890  32045 23610 
1891  27852 29420 
1892  26326 42020 
1893  23363 48660 
1894  25053 51310 
1895  20594 51844 
1896  19924 60951 
1897  13650 55890 
1898  17815 60708 
1899  15730 53846 
1900  24035 52752 
1901  17840 63624 
1902  26695 77644 
1903  19369 77041 
1904  20800 117850 
1905  14740 125187 
1906   112597 
1907   136103 
1908   161670 
1909   225286 
1910   284320 
1911   498498 
1912   669743 
1913   766237 
1914   804118 
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Note on sources and compilation: 
A comparison of whaling output in different time periods and whaling regimes could be done 
in several ways. Different methods are all associated with a variety of problems which affect 
the reliability of the comparisons.  
For our purposes, a comparison of the output of American pelagic whaling and “modern” 
whaling could be based on the number of whales killed or the amount of whale and sperm oil 
that was processed from the catches. Either type of data may illustrate the development in 
scale of the industries and especially the gradual decline and increase of the two in the 
transition period of the latter half of the 19th century. For U.S. whaling we have not been able 
to compile information on number of whales killed, only on barrels and tons. We have 
therefore relied on such data, and base our U.S. data in the period 1816 to 1905 (Column I) on  
L.E. Davis, R.E. Gallman and K. Gleiter, In the Pursuit of Leviathan. Productivity, 
Institutions, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816-1906, Chicago and London (The 
University of Chicago Press) 1997, Table 9B.1.  
 
Data on “modern” whaling, beginning in 1868 is available in International Whaling Statistics, 
Oslo 1931 (II). It lists whaling results on all whaling grounds world wide (excluding Japan 
before 1910). However, in some years on some grounds only the number of whales are 
reported; Finnmark (1868-1904), Iceland (1883-1890), Murmansk (1886-1887), Shetland and 
Hebridies (1904-1909) and Newfoundland (1904-1909). For some years additional and 
revised data are found in S. Risting, Av hvalfangstens historie, Kristiania (Cappelen) 1922 and 
J.N. Tønnessen, Den moderne hvalfangsts historie, Vol. II, Sandefjord 1967, p. 549ff. For 
those years we had to calculate the number of barrels, thus we have preferred to label our list 
of data Estimated whaling output. Since the annual composition of the catches varies a lot 
from a majority of large Blue whales in some years on some grounds, to mostly small Sei 
whales at other times, we could have used the concept of “Blue Whale Unites” (BWU) to 
create comparable figures. However, also Sperm whales and Right whales were included in 
the catches -  species that are not included in the BWU concept. We have therefore instead 
relied on a rather un-precise calculated annual average number of barrels per whale in the 
actual period. Based on accessible data we have used an average of 30 in our re-calculation 
listed in Column II .  
 
 
 
 
 
